Exclusion is in vogue in property discourse: the right to exclude is often considered property's most defining feature. In this essay, I criticize exclusion-centrism in property theory and argue that inclusion is also a key component of property. Property is an umbrella for a diverse set of property institutions, and defies a perception viewing the right to exclude, or indeed any other feature, as the ultimate core of its definition. To illustrate this point, the essay points to three examplesthe law of public accommodations, the copyright doctrine of fair use, and the law of fair housing, notably in the contexts of common-interest communities and leaseholds. The essay shows that limits on the right of owners to exclude, either by refusing to sell or lease or by insisting that non-owners refrain from physically entering their land, are quite prevalent in property law. It further argues that, in these examples, the right of non-owners to inclusion (to buy, rent, or physically enter) should not be viewed as an embarrassing aberration but rather as entailed by the very values that shape property institutions in the first place. I thus conclude that, although less characteristic, manifestations of inclusion are just as intrinsic to property as those of exclusion, and should not be analyzed as external limitations or impositions.
INTRODUCTION
Exclusion is in vogue in property discourse. After the bundle-of-sticks picture of property endorsed by the Restatement of Property had for decades been regarded as the conventional wisdom, 1 several leading property scholars again consider the right to exclude as the most defining feature of property. While no one seriously thinks any longer that property always and necessarily entails unqualified dominion, 2 Blackstone's conception of property as "sole and despotic dominion" 3 has been resurrected as the regulative idea of private property. 4 The conception of "property as exclusion" now seems ingrained in the conventional narrative of property, 5 almost inviting the claim that "the differentiating feature of a system of property [is] the right of the owner to act as the exclusive gatekeeper of the owned thing." 6 The right to exclude is indeed typical of many property institutions, at least in liberal settings. But as Tony Honoré insisted, neither this right nor any other feature typical of property is in fact the ultimate core of property. 7 Property is a complex and heterogeneous legal construct, which regulates a wide range of human relationships. This heterogeneity explains why the institutions of property bear only a family resemblance to one another. Property law, in its wisdom, has always tailored different configurations of entitlements to different property institutions so that they fit both the social context and 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY intro., § § 1-5 (1936). the nature of the resource at stake. In this way, each property institution is, at least ideally, designed according to the balance between property values that suits it best. 8 Limits on the right of individual or group property owners to exclude, whether by refusing to sell or lease or by insisting that non-owners do not physically enter their land, are quite prevalent in property law. 9 In certain circumstances, the right of non-owners to be included and exercise a right to entry is also quite typical of property 10 and is not, or at least should not be, an embarrassing aberration. In this diverse 11 set of circumstances, the right of non-owners to be included as buyers, lessees, or "physical entrants" is entailed by the very reasons-I call them property values-underlying the very support of our legal system for the pertinent property institution. Thus, although inclusion may well be less characteristic of property than exclusion, its manifestations are just as intrinsic to property and should not be perceived as external limitations or impositions. , who confuses the right to entry with limitations on exit 11 As the text implies, there are differences between the various types of right to entry, notably between the right of (certain) non-owners to enter (certain types of) property and the rights of (certain) people to buy (certain types of) property. While these categories are distinct and maybe subdivided further, the discussion below seeks to highlight that they nonetheless share important similarities. 12 As the text intimates, rights to entry are often discussed in terms of the legitimacy or desirability of allowing public law to infiltrate private law. Discussing this admittedly important question is beyond the concern of this essay. Such public values, in my view, are often but not always relevant to private law, though their effect in the horizontal contexts of private law may be different from their effect in the vertical context of public law.
three examples: 13 the law of public accommodations, with its rather early common law origins of vindicating such a right to entry; the copyright doctrine of fair use, which is unfortunately under attack in recent times; 14 and the law of fair housing (notably in the contexts of common-interest communities law and landlord-tenant law), which currently codifies the right to entry in what may well be its most important manifestation in contemporary society.
I. EXCLUSION AS THE CORE OF PROPERTY
Modern champions of the right to exclude typically begin with a fierce critique of the disaggregation of property into a bundle of sticks. 15 They then celebrate what is often perceived as the lay understanding of property as exclusion, highlighting the underappreciated wisdom in this conception, either in terms of autonomy or in terms of efficiency. The ensuing conclusion is that, although the penumbra of property may include shades and hues, its core is well captured by the owner's right to exclude. exclude." They hold that, because the morality of property must be "recognized by all members in society," it is "implausible" to say that its "essential quality" is captured by "the metaphor of bundle of sticks," implying that "the content of property rights mutates from one context to the next." Instead, Merrill and Smith argue that, although "pragmatic situational morality" may curb exclusion in the periphery of property, "the core of property is the simple right of an owner to exclude the world from the resource." Their insistence that exclusion is the core of property is founded on its in rem feature, which requires that property rights "be defined in such a way that their attributes can be easily understood by a huge number of people of diverse experience and intellectual skill."
Merrill and Smith do not arbitrate amongst the "range of possible sources" of "robust moral notions" supporting rights to exclude. They do celebrate, however, the normatively fortunate result of having such rights "present in core property situations," so as to provide "the generality, simplicity, and robustness necessary to coordinate basic expectations of large numbers of interacting members of a community." These virtues, which are "central to peaceful coordinated social existence," 18 explain and justify "that exclusion retains its presumptive moral and legal force," so that "efforts to supplement exclusion with various devices governing proper use" are perceived as "refinements outside the core of property." The "broad presumption" of the law, in this view, is and should be "that owners can dispose of property as they wish."
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James Penner similarly argues "that property is what the average citizen, free of the entanglements of legal philosophy, thinks it is: the right to a thing," or, more precisely, the right to exclusively "determine how particular things will be used." The authority to exclusively determine the use of things, or the power to exclude others "from the determination of [their] use," Penner explains, is significant "because of the freedom it provides to shape our lives," which is an important part of "any fairly robust interest in autonomy." Penner claims that "property rights can be fully explained using the concepts of exclusion and use." While use is more fundamental to autonomy than exclusion, the fact that "in the real world… the vast majority of the uses that a person will make of a thing are impossible if everyone tries to use the thing at the same time" entails the "obvious solution" of linking "rights of use with rights of exclusion." In other words, "the interest we have in purposefully dealing with things," either by way of "using in the narrow sense" or, more broadly, by "having some purpose in respect of the use to which the thing will be put," serves "a justificatory role" for the right to property, while the right to exclude others from such things is "the formal essence of the right." For Penner, this "interest in exclusively using things" unifies property because it is "regarded as a justification which explains and dictates the contours of the right which protects it." Thus, understanding property as a bundle of sticks is misleading: all these sticks (or incidents), and as such can reasonably be accounted for within the exclusion/exclusivity paradigm.
But numerous other rules prescribe the rights and obligations of members of local communities, neighbors, co-owners, partners, and family members, including rights regarding the governance of these property institutions. These property rules cannot be fairly analyzed in terms of exclusion or exclusivity: while these terms are silent as to the internal life of property, the whole point of these elaborate property governance doctrines is to provide structures for cooperative rather than competitive or hierarchical relationships. 27 Pace Penner, sharing and cooperation in these doctrines are not the choice of a person who already enjoys sole and despotic dominion, but rather a constitutive feature of the property institution, which defines the content of that person's property right. Furthermore, in shaping the contours of these property institutions, concerns about insiders' governance may be as or even more informative as concerns about outsiders' exclusion. 28 Pace Merrill and Smith, these doctrines are not marginal or peripheral to the life of property, but deal instead with some of our most commonplace human interactions and thus tend to blend into our natural environment. Therefore, postulating exclusion or exclusivity as the lay understanding of property is not only condescending but also probably mistaken.
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This failure of the exclusion/exclusivity conception of property does not mean that its bundle of sticks counterpart is any more successful. Again, understanding property as a bundle has a grain of truth. Rather than a uniform bulwark of exclusion/exclusivity or a formless bundle of rights, property should be thought of the way it actually is in both law and life: an umbrella for a set of institutions-property institutions-bearing family resemblances. argue that "some legal actors, use. 38 Thus, for example, the fact that information consumption is generally non-rivalrous implies that, when the resource at hand is information, use may not always necessitate exclusion. 39 The nature of the resource is also significant in that society approaches different resources as variously constitutive of their possessors' identity. 40 Accordingly, resources are subject to different property configurations: whereas the law vigorously vindicates people's control of their constitutive resources, the more fungible an interest, the less emphasis property law will need to place on its owner's control. 41 Given that the meaning of property is not homogeneous but varies instead with its social settings and with the categories of resources subject to property rights, searching for property's core is futile and misleading. Trying to impose a uniform conception of property on these diverse property institutions, which enable diverse forms of association and therefore diverse forms of good to flourish, would be unfortunate, because it would undermine the freedom-enhancing pluralism and the individuality-enhancing multiplicity so crucial to the liberal ideal of justice. 49 Notice the difference between these types of arguments: whereas the former merely shows that the most canonical defenses of property implicitly assume some dimension of social responsibility, the latter more directly defends the importance of incorporating social responsibility into our conception of property. quite the contrary, by facilitating dealings "on an explicit, quid pro quo basis," the market defines an important "sphere of freedom from personal ties and obligations." 55 A responsible conception of property can and should appreciate these virtues of the market commitment to dispersal of access" and insisting that we design our property system so that it dynamically ensures that "lots of people have some" property and that "pockets of illegitimately concentrated power"-i.e., property-do not re-emerge. 52 those who view the rights through the "discrete asset" paradigm are less likely to part with their rights than those who view the rights through the "bundle" paradigm. 55 See ANDERSON, supra note 42, at 145. norms, assigning the owner's power to exclude and to exclusively set the resource's agenda its proper role. 56 But at the same time, it should avoid allowing these norms to override those of the other spheres of society. Recall that property relations mediate some of our most cooperative human interactions as spouses, partners, members of local communities, and so forth. Imposing the impersonal norms of the market on these divergent spheres and rejecting the social responsibility of ownership that is part of these ongoing cooperative relationships would effectively erase these spheres of human interaction and human flourishing. My core claim here is, again, that some of the very justifications of the property institutions at hand point to substantial, albeit well-circumscribed, limits of the owners' right to exclude, as well as to important reasons for allowing entry to non-owners. Although autonomy appears to be the most obvious property value supporting a rigid understanding of property as an exclusive right, in fact it is not. As a general, right-based justification of property, the idea that personal autonomy requires individual property rights implies that every human being is entitled to some property or, more precisely, to the property needed to sustain human dignity. 58 Such a claim by non-owners is obviously relevant vis-à-vis the government, but may also be pertinent in private contexts. To see why, consider property's role in protecting people's negative liberty. Private property protects people's independence and security because it tends to spread decision-making power. Its protective effect, then, is not universally significant but rather particularly important to those who are either part of the non-organized public or of a marginal group with minor political clout. 59 The combination of, on the one hand, the special significance of providing non-owners access to property and, on the other, the inverse relation between owners' wealth and power and the importance of safeguarding their right to exclude, points to categories of cases in which our commitment to autonomy entails the non-owners' claim to entry rather than the owners' claim to exclude.
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Similar and possibly more pointed conclusions emerge from an analysis of the property value of personhood. Whereas ownership of a fungible property plays a purely instrumental role in an owner's life, holders of constitutive resources are personally attached to their properties since and insofar as they reflect their identity, because such owners can typically explain not only why they should be entitled to a right to entry, but also why the defendants at hand should be the ones who carry the burden. 58 But because I believe that part of the assessment of any theory of the law must lie in the appeal of its specific results and its ability to perform across a range of questions, 71 I conclude with a brief sketch of three case studies, where the current state of the law either roughly accords with, or else can benefit from, my theoretical observations. Regarding all three manifestations of the right to entry, considerations external to property may also be relevant, and my focus on internal ones should not be interpreted as denying their potential effect. Rather, this focus entails that the idea of property as such embraces these rights to entry, so that even friends of property who doubt the relevance of such external considerations can follow suit.
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A. Public Accommodations Law
Public accommodations law is one of the most persistent doctrines of land law in the Anglo-American tradition. At its core is the instance of the common innkeeper, whose premises "have been subjected from time immemorial to special rules" prescribing a duty "to receive and provide lodging in his inn for all comers who are travelers." 73 In the United
States, as Joseph Singer meticulous research reveals, the scope of this common law doctrine has been the subject of some curious historical developments. Available sources show that, before the Civil War, such a broad duty to serve the public probably applied to "all businesses open to the public." But later, "when the right to access was explicitly extended for the first time to African-Americans," this duty was deliberately cut back so that only innkeepers and common carriers were so obligated, while other public places were entitled "to exclude patrons on the basis of race." 74 The current state of the law, as Singer further elucidates, is also somewhat puzzling. In some jurisdictions, the applicable statutory materials do not cover the entire array of either public accommodations or insidious discrimination. Some statutes do not explicitly prohibit race discrimination in retail stores, 71 Cf. DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY 223, 232-33 (1985) . 72 Furthermore, unlike with such external considerations, employing the internal property considerations generate conclusions which do not depend on the tormented form of legal reasoning of balancing. 73 Gray & Gray, supra note 9, at 83-84. 74 Singer, supra note 57, at 1298-1300.
while others do not cover sex discrimination, and only one state has openly announced a common law doctrine whereby "all places open to the public have an obligation to serve people who enter their establishments unless they have a good reason not to do so."
Nevertheless, Singer seems persuasive when arguing that "most people, including many lawyers and law professors" believe that "businesses open to the public [do] have a duty to serve the public without unjust discrimination."
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The analysis in this essay suggests that such a general right to entry, obviously subject to the owner's authority to prescribe reasonable rules of conduct appropriate to the purpose of the premises at hand, 76 should indeed be recognized. Non-owners' right to enter public accommodations is firmly grounded not only in the public law prescription of antidiscrimination, but also in the very commitments that underlie this property institution.
Highlighting this internal foundation of public accommodations law is not only theoretically important. It is also significant in helping to circumscribe the scope of this general duty and defend its validity even against those who believe that public law values should have no-or at least no immediate or only limited-application to the horizontal relationships regulated by private law.
The common denominator of all privately-owned places purportedly subject to the right of entry prescribed by public accommodations law is that they "are deliberately laid open to public resort." 77 This feature obviously affects the possible infiltration of public law norms into the regulation of such private properties. 78 More in keeping with my current purposes, this feature is also relevant to the appropriate construction of the property institution at hand.
It prescribes, more precisely, the non-owners' right to entry, which is shaped by a finely tuned balance between the owner's reduced personhood interest and key autonomy and community interests of potential entrants.
Indeed, the property value of personhood easily explains the difference between ownership of a hotel or a retail store and ownership of a home. Our home is one of our 75 See id., at 1290-91. 76 Gray & Gray, supra note 9, at 99-100. 77 Gray & Gray, supra note 9, at 90. 78 Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) ("The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it").
quintessential constitutive resources, 79 and as such should be a priori immune from public regulation. By contrast, most commercial businesses are held by their owners, which are frequently characterless corporations, in a purely instrumental fashion. Insofar as these public accommodations are concerned, the property value of personhood seems indifferent to a legal prescription of non-owners' right to entry.
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Autonomy is even more receptive to such a right. An unqualified right to exclude would obviously have strengthened the negative liberty of public accommodations' owners.
Its detrimental effect on other people's autonomy, however, would have been much more significant, given that the ability to physically enter such places is a precondition for accessing many social and economic opportunities crucial for personal development in contemporary society. This function of public accommodations as a locus of opportunities and development further explains the insult and alienation implied by exclusion. 
B. Fair Use
In what may seem a dramatic shift, but is hardly so from a right to entry perspective, I
turn from the patrons of a restaurant, a theatre, or a shopping mall to the public having recourse to music, to a novel, or to computer software. People making use of these resources may wish to access the copyrighted work or engage it in their own creative activity. 84 If exclusion/exclusivity is the regulative principle of property, and if copyright is a species of property (a property institution in my vocabulary), 85 then both forms of use should be dependent upon the copyright owner's consent. In many cases, however, users figuratively enter the owners' domain and legitimately bypass their consent. One important category of cases governed by such a right to (free) entry is the fair use doctrine.
Like public accommodations law, fair use is a veteran doctrine dating back to the 1840s, 86 which explicitly limits the owner's exclusive rights. 87 In its now codified form, this doctrine prescribes that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies … for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." A determination of fair use in this context requires the consideration of these factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) Like public accommodations law, fair use does not need to summon normative concerns external to the property institution to which it belongs. The opposite is true:
although such external considerations, notably those grounded in free speech, are certainly relevant, fair use can also neatly fit the normative underpinnings of copyright as a property institution. To establish this point, I do not need to delve into the voluminous literature on the foundations of copyright or resolve any of its debates. 89 The following, rather uncontroversial propositions, will suffice.
One major welfarist goal of copyright law concerns the encouragement of creative activity. Providing such incentives is important because: (1) Creative activity serves human flourishing by facilitating both human culture and the processes of selfgovernance.
(2) Creative resources may otherwise be undersupplied because the expected costs of their production tend to be high while the costs of their copying, which may turn the copier into a competitor, are rather low. 90 Both propositions are significant for my purposes. The latter implies that the scope and the content of authors' rights should be carefully delineated in order to avoid the unfortunate predicament of society paying too much for its creative resources or undermining future creativity, which inevitably engages, invokes, and is inspired by preexisting cultural raw materials. The former proposition reminds us that copyright must never aim only at maximizing the size of the creative pie without looking at its distribution, and that the widespread dissemination of creative resources is important not only because of our public commitment to distributive justice, but also because of the cultural and democratic purposes inherent in the property institution of copyright.
Besides encouraging creativity, copyright also serves a more individualistic value based on the unique significance of creative resources to the authors' identity.
Notwithstanding counter examples, copyright protects, at its core, works that constitute "the likely to share these current preferences. Thus, Rose's specific explanation may well be partial and unsatisfactory. And yet, her more general claim that Shelley presents "some of the best instincts of property law" is right on point. 103 In fact, these instincts are founded on property values, that is, on the values that justify property institutions as a whole and, more specifically, the property institutions at hand, notably common-interest communities and leaseholds. For this task, Rose invokes the property value of utility that, on its face, also seems to support the Fair Housing Act's limitations on landlords' power to exclude. But the values of autonomy, personhood, and community are even more determinative.
Consider how both Shelley's rule and the basic entry rule set by the Fair Housing Act can be firmly premised on the property value of autonomy. The limitation on entry struck down in Shelley, for example, so sweepingly restricted alienability-depriving current owners of a substantial pool of buyers-that it is practically tantamount to a substantial limitation on exit. Exit, however, referring to the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself off from relationships with others, is a bedrock liberal value. 104 A strong commitment to exit, to the idea of open boundaries that enable geographical, social, familial, and political mobility, "enhances the capacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and pursue our ends." 105 Indeed, because impeding exit is incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets, property law has always been suspicious of restraints on alienation. 106 Furthermore, not only is the autonomy of property owners' at stake here.
Implicit in the discussion of their right to exit is a concern for the autonomy of potential entrants, which is no less and perhaps even more significant. Limiting the opportunities of certain people to buy or lease houses or apartments in a certain geographical area undermines the role of property as a locus of individual control. In other words, exclusionary practices that unreasonably limit the mobility of the excluded persons and thus their autonomy must be invalidated. 107 True, concern for the autonomy of entrants seems to be rightly defeated in some settings by the autonomy and personhood concerns of property owners. Thus, the Fair Housing Act vigorously protects the right to exclude in intimate settings, where the personhood value of the owner (potential landlord) trumps any possible interest of potential tenants. 108 Yet, as mentioned above, the Act reverses this rule and recognizes a rather capacious right to entry when the lessor is a commercial entity. One who acknowledges that negative liberty is not an ultimate value but rather a means for individual autonomy must recognize that the claims of people who wish to establish their life in a certain locus override those of people who perceive property as a fungible asset. 109 This is particularly true when the latter's refusal to rent is contemptuous, namely, related to conspicuous features of the potential lessee's identity. 110 Prima facie, this conclusion is limited to cases where the landlord enjoys a local monopoly in the relevant area. But the scope of legitimate entitlements to force entry is not limited to these extreme instances and includes cases where, due to the convergence of local owners' attitudes in a certain area, a non-owner's right to entry is virtually meaningless without the power to curtail the owners' exclusionary practices. In all these cases, landlords enjoy the exclusive right to determine the use of their premises and the terms of their leasing, but they neither are nor should be entitled to an absolute right to exclude unwanted lessees or to exclusively determine the type of lessees that qualify. Their attempt to do so would undermine rather than serve the property values of autonomy and personhood, as well as that of utility mentioned above.
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Similar conclusions follow from the community value of property. As noted, there are limits to the legitimate authority to exclude in close-knit cultural communities as well as in thinner common interest communities, where the shared community values ensue from rather than precede the community-friendly property institution. My brief above discussion of these limits 112 suffices to support two conclusions about these two types of communities.
First, the law should, as it does, police exclusionary practices in residential communities insofar as these are used against, rather than by, cultural minority groups. 113 Second, the law should make sure that the limits on entry applied by garden-variety or thin common interest communities are indeed necessary to ensure that those excluded are "bad cooperators" likely to jeopardize the success of the commons property, and that shared cooperative values are fostered. This means that courts need to supervise admissions criteria in such communities as well as the way they are implemented on the ground. 114 One implication of this prescription is that rejections of applicants for admissions must be reasoned, and that the reasons must be sufficiently detailed so that both their evaluative and factual components can be properly scrutinized.
Friends of the exclusion/exclusivity paradigm tend to resist this significant prescription. They argue that a duty to reason can undermine the ability of such communities to achieve the legitimate goal of a desirable social composition because of its entailed litigation costs, including the costs of possible judicial errors, and because of the risk that revealing the admissions criteria would generate strategic pretence by applicants. 115 These concerns are not without theoretical merit, but I doubt whether their weight is substantial enough to outweigh those mentioned above, at least for those of us who refuse to perceive utility as the only value at stake. The law requires judges to make similarly or even more complicated decisions in many other contexts, and I doubt that the marginal risk of strategic pretence generated by transparency is significant. Indeed, the duty to justify would probably improve the quality of admission procedures, since it requires information-gathering and makes reliance on prejudice more costly.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In many contexts, owners justifiably enjoy a robust right to exclude and to exclusively determine the resource's agenda. Yet, the proposition that either of these rights is the differentiating feature of property and that property at its core is an exclusive right, is a gross overstatement. Exclusion and exclusivity are typical of many property institutions because and to the extent that they serve the property values underlying these institutions.
Property institutions vary, however, and each type is characterized by a different balance of such property values as autonomy, personhood, utility, community, and social responsibility. Exclusion and exclusivity, therefore, are often limited and at times superseded by the claim of potential entrants to be included. Like the owner's right to 114 Cf. Alexander, supra note 64, at 55-60. 
